Universal Doomsday: Analyzing Our Prospects for Survival by Gerig, Austin et al.
Prepared for submission to JCAP
Universal Doomsday: Analyzing Our
Prospects for Survival
Austin Gerig,a Ken D. Olum,b and Alexander Vilenkinb
aCABDyN Complexity Centre, Sa¨ıd Business School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1
1HP, UK
bInstitute of Cosmology, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Tufts University, Medford
MA 02155, USA
E-mail: austin.gerig@sbs.ox.ac.uk, kdo@cosmos.phy.tufts.edu,
vilenkin@cosmos.phy.tufts.edu
Abstract. Given a sufficiently large universe, numerous civilizations almost surely exist.
Some of these civilizations will be short-lived and die out relatively early in their develop-
ment, i.e., before having the chance to spread to other planets. Others will be long-lived,
potentially colonizing their galaxy and becoming enormous in size. What fraction of civ-
ilizations in the universe are long-lived? The “universal doomsday” argument states that
long-lived civilizations must be rare because if they were not, we should find ourselves living
in one. Furthermore, because long-lived civilizations are rare, our civilization’s prospects for
long-term survival are poor. Here, we develop the formalism required for universal doomsday
calculations and show that while the argument has some force, our future is not as gloomy
as the traditional doomsday argument would suggest, at least when the number of early
existential threats is small.
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1 Introduction
The Doomsday Argument [1, 2]1 traditionally runs as follows. Perhaps our civilization will
soon succumb to some existential threat (nuclear war, asteroid impact, pandemic, etc.) so
that the number of humans ever to exist is not much more than the number who have
existed so far. We will call such a civilization short-lived and the total number of humans
in it NS . Alternatively, we might survive all such threats and become long-lived, potentially
colonizing other planets and eventually generating a large total number of individuals, NL.
For simplicity we will consider only two possible sizes. We expect NL  NS . The ratio
R = NL/NS could easily be as large as a billion.
We don’t know our chances of being short- or long-lived, but we can assign some prior
belief or credence P (S) and P (L) = 1 − P (S) in these two possibilities. These confidence
levels should be based on our analysis of specific threats that we have considered and the
possibility of other threats of which we are not yet aware.
Suppose that you hold such confidence levels at a time when you don’t know your own
position in the entire human race. Now you discover that you are one of the first NS humans
to be born. We will call this datum D. If the human race is to be short-lived, D is certain.
If the human race is to be long-lived, assuming that you can consider yourself a randomly
chosen human [5–8], the chance that you would be in the first NS is only 1/R. Thus you
should update your probabilities using Bayes’ Rule, to get
P (L|D) = P (L)/R
P (L)/R+ P (S)
=
P (L)
P (L) + P (S)R
<
1
P (S)R
. (1.1)
Since it is clear that we do face existential threats, P (S) is not infinitesimal. Thus P (S)R
1, P (L|D) 1, and doom (our civilization ending soon rather than growing to large size) is
nearly certain.
1Gott [3] and Nielsen [4] make similar arguments.
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Many counterarguments have been offered (e.g., [7, 9–12]). The specific issue which
will concern us here is the possibility that our universe might contain many civilizations. In
that case, we should consider ourselves to be randomly chosen from all individuals in that
universe or multiverse. Before taking into account D, our chance to be in any given long-
lived civilization is then higher than our chance to be in any given short-lived civilization by
factor R. Taking into account D simply cancels this factor, so the chance that we are in a
long-lived civilization is just the fraction of civilizations that are long-lived. (More compactly,
since each civilization contains NS individuals who observe D, this observation provides no
reason to prefer one type of civilization over another.)
Thus if there are many civilizations, the doomsday argument is defeated. However, it
returns in another form, called the universal doomsday argument [13, 14]. We are more likely
to observe D in a universe in which most civilizations are short-lived. While we can no longer
conclude anything unique to our own civilization, we can conclude that most civilizations are
likely to be short-lived, and thus ours is likely to be short-lived also.
This paper analyzes the universal doomsday argument. In contrast to the traditional
doomsday argument, which in almost all circumstances makes doom nearly certain, for many
reasonable priors the universal argument gives only a mildly pessimistic conclusion. However,
for other priors, the conclusion of the universal argument can be quite strong.
The analysis of many civilizations in the universe can be extended to analyze possible
civilizations that might exist according to different theories of the universe. If we take
ourselves to be randomly chosen among all observers that might exist [9, 12], the doomsday
argument is completely canceled, and after taking into account D we find no change in our
prior probabilities for different lifetimes of our civilization. This assumption, equivalent to
the self-indication assumption [9], is a controversial one, and the authors of the present paper
are not in agreement about it. However, for the purpose of the present work we will consider
the consequences of denying this idea, and consider ourselves to be randomly chosen only
among those individuals who exist in our actual universe.
In the next section we set up the formalism for calculating the probability P (L) for a
civilization to be long-lived. To simplify the discussion, we focus on a special case where
civilizations can have only two possible sizes; the general case is discussed in the Appendix.
In Sections 3–6 this formalism is applied to find P (L) for several choices of the prior. Our
conclusions are summarized and discussed in Section 7.
2 The fraction of long-lived civilizations in the universe
Assume the universe is large enough such that numerous civilizations exist. Assume further-
more that a fraction fL of the civilizations are long-lived, containing NL individuals each,
and the remaining fraction 1 − fL of the civilizations are short-lived, containing only NS
individuals each. (The general case in which civilizations may have any size, rather than just
the specific sizes NS and NL, is discussed in the appendix.) We will take the universe to be
finite or the problems that arise in infinite universes to have been solved, so that the fraction
fL is well defined.
We do not know what fL is, but we know it must be in the interval, [0, 1]. We can
represent our prior belief, or “best guess” for different values of fL, with a density function
P (fL), so that P (fL)dfL is our prior probability for the fraction of long-lived civilizations to
lie within an infinitesimal interval dfL around fL. We only consider normalized priors so that∫ 1
0 P (fL)dfL = 1.
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Figure 1. The likelihood function, P (D|f), given R = 106, R = 109, and R = 1012.
Whatever we take as our prior, we should update it after observing new evidence or
data. The rest of this paper is concerned with updating P (fL) after considering the datum
D: we were born into a civilization that has not yet reached long-lived status. Bayes’ Rule
gives
P (fL|D) = P (D|fL)P (fL)∫
dfLP (D|fL)P (fL) . (2.1)
With a given fL, the probability of observing D, P (D|fL), is just the ratio of the number
of observers making observation D to the total number of observers. Factoring out the total
number of civilizations, we divide the number of observers in each civilization finding D,
which is just NS , by the average number of observers per civilization, NLfL + NS(1 − fL).
Thus
P (D|fL) = NS
NS(1− fL) +NLfL =
1
1 + fL(R− 1) . (2.2)
In Fig. 1, we plot the likelihood function given R = 106, R = 109, and R = 1012.
Plugging the likelihood into (2.1),
P (fL|D) = P (fL)/(1 + fL(R− 1))∫ 1
0 dfLP (fL)/(1 + fL(R− 1))
. (2.3)
The posterior distribution, P (fL|D), expresses our updated belief in different values of fL
after considering that our civilization is not yet long-lived.
Notice that P (fL|D) ∝ P (D|fL)P (fL) and that P (D|fL) is much larger for low values
of fL than for high values of fL (see Fig. 1). Therefore, when updating our prior, we place
more credence in low values of fL and less credence in high values of fL, and so become more
pessimistic about the fraction of civilizations that reach long-lived status.
We can now compute the probability that our civilization will eventually be long-lived.
For any given fL, this probability is just fL, the fraction of civilizations that are long-lived.
Without considering D, we would just take an average of the possible fL weighted by the
prior,
P (L) =
∫
dfL fLP (fL) . (2.4)
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To get the posterior chance, we integrate over our posterior probability distribution for fL,
P (L|D) =
∫
dfL fLP (fL|D) =
∫ 1
0 dfL fLP (fL)/(1 + fL(R− 1))∫ 1
0 dfLP (fL)/(1 + fL(R− 1))
. (2.5)
Given R and the prior distribution P (fL), (2.5) allows us to determine our civilization’s
prospects for long-term survival.
Equation (2.5) is exact, but since we are interested only in R  1, we can always
approximate
P (L|D) ≈
∫ 1
0 dfL fLP (fL)/(1 + fLR))∫ 1
0 dfLP (fL)/(1 + fLR)
=
∫ 1
0 dfL fLP (fL)/(R
−1 + fL)∫ 1
0 dfLP (fL)/(R
−1 + fL)
. (2.6)
In many cases the contribution from fL . R−1 to the numerator is not significant, and we
can thus approximate the numerator by
∫ 1
0 dfLP (fL) = 1, giving
P (L|D) ≈
[∫ 1
0
dfL
P (fL)
(R−1 + fL)
]−1
. (2.7)
In some cases there is a cutoff on fL that keeps it above R
−1 and in such cases we can write
P (L|D) ≈
[∫ 1
0
dfL
P (fL)
fL
]−1
. (2.8)
From (2.8) we can understand the general effect of the universal doomsday argument.
The chance that our civilization will survive to large sizes is small when the integral is large.
This happens whenever there is a possibility of small fL where the prior probability of those
fL is large compared to the fL themselves. So, for example, if our prior gives a collective
probability of 10−6 to a range of fL near 10−9, i.e., we think there’s one chance in a million
that only a billionth of all civilizations grow large, then our chance of survival is no more
than 10−3.
The effect of using (2.7) instead of (2.8) is that the above argument does not apply to
fL below R
−1. The doomsday argument is able to increase a prior probability by factor R
at most, so scenarios with prior probabilities below R−1 will never be important.
In the rest of this paper, we will consider several specific priors and see the conclusions
to which they lead.
3 The uniform prior
The results for P (L|D) will depend on our prior P (fL). Let us start by taking the simplest
prior,
P (fL) = 1 , (3.1)
so that the fL is equally likely to have any value. This appears to be a reasonable choice of
prior when we do not have much quantitative information on the existential threats that we
are facing. The posterior density is then
P (fL|D) = R− 1
(lnR)(1 + fL(R− 1)) . (3.2)
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Figure 2. Cumulative priors and posteriors with R = 106 and equal prior credence given to all fL
In Fig. 2, we plot the cumulative of the prior and posterior, P (fL ≤ f) and P (fL ≤ f |D),
given R = 106. Although the probability of low values of fL increases after considering D,
the result is not extreme. For example, the probability that fL > 1/2 is 5% — a low but
non-negligible amount.
The probability that our civilization is long-lived, after considering D, is
P (L|D) = 1
lnR
− 1
R− 1 . (3.3)
Because P (L|D) ∼ 1/ lnR, our long-term prospects are not too bad. For example, when
R = 1 million, our civilization’s chance of long-term survival is approximately 7%.
We can compare these results with the traditional doomsday argument. Using the
uniform prior, the prior chance that our civilization would be long-lived is 1/2, and the
posterior chance about 1/ lnR. If we took a prior chance of survival P (L) = 1/2 in the
traditional doomsday argument, (1.1) would give our chance of survival as only 1/(R + 1).
Thus, at least in this case, taking account of the existence of multiple civilizations yields a
much more optimistic conclusion.
We can reproduce the traditional doomsday argument even in the universal setting,
merely by asserting that all civilizations have the same fate, so the benefit of multiple civi-
lizations is eliminated. This would imply giving no credence to any possibilities except fL = 0
(all civilizations short-lived) and fL = 1 (all civilizations long-lived). Thus we could write
P (fL) = P (L)δ(fL) + (1− P (L))δ(fL − 1) . (3.4)
Using (3.4) in (2.5) reproduces (1.1).
4 N existential threats
Of course we know that civilizations face more than one existential threat. So let us consider
the case where there are N statistically independent threats and take a uniform prior for the
fraction of civilizations that survive each one. Denote the fraction of civilizations surviving
the i-th threat fi. The fraction of civilizations that survive all threats is then
fL = f1f2f3 . . . fN , (4.1)
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and our prior for each threat is
P (fi) = 1 , (4.2)
so that
P (f1, f2, . . . , fN ) = P (f1)P (f2) . . . P (fN ) = 1 . (4.3)
We can determine the density function for the overall prior, P (fL), as follows. Let l =
| ln fL| = − ln fL =
∑
li where li = | ln li|. Then
P (l) = P (fL)
dfL
dl
= P (fL)e
−l . (4.4)
Similarly P (li) = e
−li , so l is the sum of N independent and exponentially distributed random
variables, and P (fL) is thus given by an Erlang (Gamma) distribution,
P (l) =
lN−1e−l
(N − 1)! , (4.5)
giving
P (fL) =
| ln fL|N−1
(N − 1)! . (4.6)
The cumulative of the prior, P (fL ≤ f), is shown in Fig. 3(a) for N = 1 to N = 5. Note
that our civilization’s prospects for long-term survival become rather bleak as N increases.
Even without considering our datum, P (L) = 1/2N .
Now, considering our datum D, the posterior density is,
P (fL|D) = (1−R)
LiN (1−R)
| ln fL|N−1
(N − 1)!(1 + fL(R− 1)) , (4.7)
where LiN is the polylogarithm function, given by
LiN (z) =
1
Γ(N)
∫ ∞
0
tN−1
z−1et − 1 . (4.8)
The cumulative of the posterior, P (fL ≤ f |D), is shown in Fig. 3(b) for N = 1 to N = 5 and
R = 106.
In Fig. 4, P (L|D) is shown as a function of R for N = 1 through N = 5. After
considering D, our civilization’s prospects for long-term survival are
P (L|D) = − 1
LiN (1−R) −
1
R− 1 . (4.9)
When lnR N , we can approximate
P (L|D) ≈ N !
(lnR)N
. (4.10)
Notice that when N = 1, the prior distribution for fL is uniform and the results are
the same as in the previous section. As seen in Fig. 4, increasing the number of existential
threats, N , decreases the probability that our civilization will be long-lived. The chance of
survival before taking into account D is P (L) = 2−N . Updating adds the additional factor
P (L|D)
P (L)
≈ 2
NN !
(lnR)N
, (4.11)
which is small whenever lnR  N . However, only a power of lnR, rather than R itself,
appears in the denominator, so the effect is more benign than in the traditional doomsday
argument of (1.1), so long as N is fairly small.
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Figure 3. The cumulative of the (a) priors and (b) posteriors of fL given N existential threats and
R = 106.
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Figure 4. The probability that our civilization will be long-lived as a function of R given N existential
threats.
5 An unknown number of threats: Gaussian distribution
It would be foolish to imagine that we know of all existential threats. For example, before the
1930’s no one could have imagined the threat of nuclear war. So there is some uncertainty
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about the number of threats, N . To make a simple model of this effect, let us assume that a
fixed fraction q of civilizations survive each threat, and thus fN = q
N survive them all. We
will take a Gaussian prior for the distribution of N ,
PN =
1
Z
e−(N/N0)
2
, (5.1)
where
Z =
∞∑
N=0
e−(N/N0)
2 ≈
√
piN0 + 1
2
. (5.2)
For the purposes of the present section it is a good enough approximation to drop the 1 and
just use Z =
√
piN0/2.
The prior expectation value for N is
〈N〉 =
∑
NPN ≈
∫ ∞
0
NPN =
N0√
pi
. (5.3)
The prior chance that our civilization will grow large is
P (L) =
∑
PNfN ≈ 1
Z
∑
fN =
1
Z(1− q) , (5.4)
providing that N0| ln q|  1, so that the Gaussian does not decline until qN is already small.
Thus the prior chance of survival is quite appreciable.
The posterior chance of survival may be approximated
P (L|D) ≈
[∑ PN
R−1 + fN
]−1
= Z
[∑ e−N2/N20
R−1 + qN
]−1
. (5.5)
As N increases, the numerator in the sum decreases more and more quickly. We can approx-
imate that the denominator decreases by a factor q, until N = lnR/| ln q|, at which point
it becomes constant. Thus for N < lnR/| ln q|, the Nth term in the sum is larger than the
previous term by factor of order
e−2N/N
2
0 /q = e| ln q|−2N/N
2
0 , (5.6)
so the sum is dominated by terms near N = N20 | ln q|/2 or near N = lnR/| ln q|, whichever
is smaller.
In the former case, it is interesting to note that N is proportional to N20 , not N0 as
one might have thought. The doomsday argument partly cancels the Gaussian suppression
of the prior probability, which drops rapidly when N > N0.
We can approximate the sum by an integral,∫ ∞
0
dN exp
(
−(N −N
2
0 | ln q|/2)2
N20
+
N20 | ln q|2
4
)
≈ √piN0 exp
(
N20 | ln q|2
4
)
, (5.7)
so
P (L|D) ≈ 1
2
exp
(
−N
2
0 | ln q|2
4
)
≈ 1
2
e−0.12N
2
0 , (5.8)
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Figure 5. The probability that our civilization will be long-lived as a function of R with the Gaussian
prior of (5.1) for the number of threats, with the parameter N0 = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10.
where the last step is for q = 1/2. If N0 is small, this is not too pessimistic a conclusion.
For example with N0 = 5 threats we find P (L|D) ≈ 0.02, but for N0 = 10 we find P (L|D) ≈
2× 10−6.
To be in this regime, we require that N20 | ln q|/2 < lnR/| ln q|, i.e.,
lnR >
N20 | ln q|2
2
≈ 0.24N20 , (5.9)
for q = 1/2. For N0 = 10 this requires R > 2× 1010, which is not unreasonable.
Fig. 5 shows our prospects for long-term survival as a function of R for various values of
N0. Because 〈N〉 ≈ N0/
√
pi ≈ N0/2, a given N0 corresponds roughly to choosing N = N0/2
in the previous section.
Comparing Fig. 5 for each N0 to Fig. 4 for N = 2N0, we see that, as R becomes larger,
Fig. 4 shows lower survival chances than Fig. 5. In the present case the doomsday argument
amplifies the probability of small f that arise from a large number of threats, but because
we took fixed q we don’t consider threats that have very low survival probability. In the
previous section, we fixed N , but the uniform prior gave some chance to arbitrarily small f .
6 An unknown number of threats: exponential distribution
The reason that the conclusion of the previous section was not too pessimistic is that the
Gaussian prior for PN very strongly suppressed numbers of threats N  N0. If we take a
distribution that falls only exponentially, the result may be quite different. So consider now
PN = (1− s)sN , (6.1)
for some s < 1. The prior expectation value for N is
〈N〉 =
∑
NPN =
s
1− s , (6.2)
and the prior chance of survival is
P (L) =
∑
PNfN =
1− s
1− sq . (6.3)
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The posterior chance of survival is given by
P (L|D) ≈
[
(1− s)
∑ sN
R−1 + qN
]−1
. (6.4)
If s < q, our prior credence in N threats decreases faster than the chance of surviving N
threats, and the terms in the sum in (6.4) decrease. Except when q is very close to s, we can
ignore R and get an optimistic conclusion
P (L|D) ≈ 1− s/q
1− s . (6.5)
But if s > q, the situation is different. In this case, our credence in a large number of
threats is higher than the survival chance, and then the universal doomsday argument acts
to increase our prior for facing many threats and so decrease our expectation of survival.
The terms in the sum in (6.4) increase as (s/q)N until we reach some N where the existence
of R begins to matter. This happens when qN ∼ R−1, i.e., when
N ≈ N ′ = lnR| ln q| . (6.6)
For N > N ′ we can ignore q to get RsN in the sum of (6.4). Thus we can split our sum into
two parts, which give
(s/q)N
′ − 1
s/q − 1 +
RsN
′
1− s =
(
1
s/q − 1 +
1
1− s
)
R1−| ln s|/| ln q| , (6.7)
and so
P (L|D) ≈ s− q
s− sqR
| ln s|/| ln q|−1 . (6.8)
As long as s is significantly larger than q, this is very small. As an example, we can choose
q = 1/2 and s = 3/4. This gives the prior probability P (L) = 0.8 here, while (5.4) and (5.2)
give P (L) = 0.81. While these are nearly the same, (6.8) with R = 109 gives
P (L|D) ≈ 4× 10−6 , (6.9)
must lower than P (L|D) ≈ 0.02 from (5.8).
Fig. 6 shows our prospects for long-term survival as a function of R for various values
of s.
7 Summary and discussion
Bayes’ Theorem tells us how the probabilities we assign to various hypotheses should be
updated when we learn new information. The Doomsday Argument is concerned with the
impact of the important piece of information that we called D — that we are among the
first NS humans to be born. Earlier investigations [1–4, 13, 14] suggested that the resulting
probability for our civilization to be long-lived is suppressed by a huge factor R = NL/NS 
1, where NL is the size a civilization may reach if it does not succumb to early existential
threats. Here, we attempted a more careful analysis by considering a number of possible
choices of prior probabilities. We found that, with a seemingly reasonable choice of the prior,
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Figure 6. The probability that our civilization will be long-lived as a function of R with the ex-
ponential prior of (6.1) for the number of threats, with the parameter s = 1/2, 2/3, 3/4, 4/5, 5/6
corresponding to 〈N〉 being 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
our chances of long-term survival are suppressed by a power of lnR, rather than by R, with
the power determined by the number of threats N . If N is not too large, the probability of
long-term survival is about a few percent.
This conclusion has been reached by assuming a flat prior distribution, P (fi) = 1,
for the fraction of civilizations fi surviving statistically independent threats (labeled by i).
This appears to be a reasonable assumption, reflecting our present state of ignorance on the
subject. We also considered a prior where the survival probability for each threat is a fixed
number q, while the number of threats N is a stochastic variable with a Gaussian distribution
of width N0. Once again, we find, assuming that q is not too small and N0 is not too large,
that the Bayesian suppression factor is much smaller than suggested by the naive Doomsday
Argument.
In our analysis, we adopted a model where civilizations can have only two possible
sizes, NS and NL. This model is of course not realistic in detail, but it may well capture
the bimodal character of the realistic size distribution. Civilizations that actively engage
in colonizing other planetary systems and reach a certain critical size are likely to grow
extremely large, while civilizations confined to their home planet must be rather limited in
size.
Even though we found a greater survival probability than in Refs. [1–4, 13, 14], our
conclusions can hardly be called optimistic. With the priors that we considered, the fraction
of civilizations that last long enough to become large is not likely to exceed a few percent.
If there is a message here for our own civilization, it is that it would be wise to devote
considerable resources (i) for developing methods of diverting known existential threats and
(ii) for space exploration and colonization. Civilizations that adopt this policy are more likely
to be among the lucky few that beat the odds. Somewhat encouragingly, our results indicate
that the odds are not as overwhelmingly low as suggested by earlier work.
A Arbitrary possibilities for civilization size
In this appendix we give a formalism for considering all possible civilization sizes. Let a
scenario be a set of numbers fn, n = 0 . . .∞ giving the fraction of civilizations that have
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each size n. Since every civilization has some size, we must have
∑
n fn = 1. We will write
f for the entire vector of numbers fn. The average number of observers per civilization in
scenario f is
n(f) =
∑
n
nfn , (A.1)
which we will assume is finite.
Now let P (f) denote the prior probability that we assign to each possible scenario f .
The probabilities must be normalized, ∫
df P (f) = 1 , (A.2)
where ∫
df denotes
∫ 1
0
df0
∫ 1
0
df1
∫ 1
0
df2 . . . . (A.3)
We suppose that P (f) already contains a term such as δ(1−∑n fn) that excludes unnormal-
ized f .
Let n0 denote the size of our civilization. We will not be concerned here with issues
related to civilizations with fewer than n0 observers, so let us suppose that P (f) is supported
only when fn = 0 for n < n0. Now we consider the datum D, that we are in the first n0
individuals in our civilization. The chance for a randomly chosen observer to observe D is
P (D|f) = n0
n(f)
. (A.4)
Now let A be some property of f , such as the average size of a civilization or the chance that
the civilization has more than a certain number of members. The average value of A not
taking into account D is
〈A〉 =
∫
df A(f)P (f) . (A.5)
Now we take D into account using Bayes’ Rule. We find
P (f |D) = P (D|f)P (f)∫
df ′ P (D|f ′)P (f ′) =
P (f)/n(f)∫
df ′ P (f ′)/n(f ′)
, (A.6)
which is the arbitrary-size generalization of (2.3). The average value of A taking into account
D is
〈A〉|D =
∫
df A(f)P (f |D) =
∫
df A(f)P (f)/n(f)∫
df P (f)/n(f)
. (A.7)
A particularly simple case is when A(f) = n(f). The expected value of the total size of
our civilization taking into account D is
〈n〉|D = 1∫
df P (f)/n(f)
. (A.8)
Alternatively, let fL(f) =
∑∞
n=NL
fn be the fraction of civilizations in scenario f that
grow larger than some threshold NL. The posterior chance that our civilization will reach
this threshold is then
P (L|D) = 〈fL〉|D =
∫
df fL(f)P (f)/n(f)∫
df P (f)/n(f)
. (A.9)
– 12 –
This is just the fraction of large civilizations in the different scenarios, weighted by prior
probability of the scenario and the inverse of the average civilization size according to that
scenario.
Unfortunately, the set of possible priors is so large here that it is difficult to make any
progress. It seems likely to us that civilizations will either remain confined to a single planet
and eventually be wiped out by some disaster, or spread through the galaxy and grow to
large size. We can approximate this by considering P (f) supported only at two sizes NS and
NL,
P (f) = P (fL) δ(fS + fL − 1)
∏
n6=NL,NS
δ(fn) , (A.10)
where we have written fL for fNL and fS for fNS . Then we recover the results in the main
text. Integrals P (f)df become P (fL)dfL, n(f) is just (1− fL)NS +NLfL, fL(f) is fL, (A.6)
becomes (2.3), and (A.9) becomes (2.5).
References
[1] B. Carter unpublished.
[2] J. Leslie, Risking the world’s end, Bulletin of the Canadian Nuclear Society May 1989 (1989)
10–15.
[3] J. R. Gott, III, Implications of the copernican principle for our future prospects, Nature 363
(1993) 315–319.
[4] H. B. Nielsen, Random dynamics and relations between the number of fermion generations and
the fine structure constants, Acta Physica Polonica B 20 (1989) 427–468.
[5] A. Vilenkin, Predictions from quantum cosmology, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74 (1995) 846–849,
[gr-qc/9406010].
[6] D. N. Page, Sensible quantum mechanics: are probabilities only in the mind?, Int.J.Mod.Phys.
D5 (1996) 583–596, [gr-qc/9507024].
[7] N. Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects. Routledge, New York, 2002.
[8] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Prediction and explanation in the multiverse, Phys.Rev. D77
(2008) 043526, [arXiv:0711.2559].
[9] D. Dieks, Doomsday — or: The dangers of statistics, Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1992) 78–84.
[10] T. Kopf, P. Krtous, and D. N. Page, “Too soon for doom gloom.” Physics preprint
ALBERTA-THY-17-94, http://arXiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9407002.
[11] P. Bartha and C. Hitchcock, No one knows the date or the hour: An unorthodox application of
Rev. Bayes’s theorem, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 66 (1999) S339–S353.
[12] K. D. Olum, The Doomsday argument and the number of possible observers, Phil.Q. 52 (2002)
164, [gr-qc/0009081].
[13] J. Knobe, K. D. Olum, and A. Vilenkin, Philosophical implications of inflationary cosmology,
Brit.J.Phil.Sci. 57 (2006) 47–67, [physics/0302071].
[14] A. Gerig, The Doomsday Argument in Many Worlds, arXiv:1209.6251.
– 13 –
